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1. Introduction 
 
“If people are good only because they fear punishment, and hope for 
reward, then we are a sorry lot indeed.”  
Albert Einstein in Calaprice (2000) 
 
The purpose of this essay is to find whether Kant’s Categorical Imperative 
(KCI) is compatible with instrumental rationality, and if so, under what 
circumstances. KCI is often mentioned as a reference on what moral standard is 
concerned: it classifies courses of action as morally permissible or not. 
Instrumental rationality is at the heart of Economics and its aim is to model 
agents’ decisions. Its outcome-oriented way of reasoning appears to go directly 
against KCI. Moral issues were at the birth of Economics. “An Inquiry into the 
Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations” Smith (1776), was in the following 
of Smith’s previous book “The Theory of Moral Sentiments” Smith (1970), where 
the author was mainly concerned with the conflict between pursuing self-interest 
and moral judgments. He derives social behaviour and social institutions from a 
set of principles he argues are on their origin. This work, laid the psychological 
foundations for its acclaimed classic. Social norms and institutions are each time 
more and more used in recent economic research in many different fields, from 
growth theory to the economics of institutions, from political economics to 
decision theory.  
 
1.1 Question 
Economics’ object of study is to “(…) know how individuals and society 
decide on what to do with scarce resources, that can have alternative ends, that 
may be used to produce goods and services and how to share them to be 
consumed now or in the future (…)” Andrade (1998).  The theoretical framework 
concerning how agents decide is a corner stone of Economics. For long, in spite of 
recent advances in behavioural economics, instrumental rationality has been at the 
foundations of most models being presented. It requires only that the agents order 
their preferences consistently and act accordingly (maximizing their utility). 
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Rationality is then presented as an instrument to an end, maximizing welfare. 
Kant argues that “The moral worth of an action does not lie in the effect expected 
from it, nor in any principle of action which requires to borrow its motive from 
this expected effect.”, Serafini (1989) , This suggests that when deciding, the agent 
should not take into concern the outcome of its actions. This hardly looks rational 
in view of instrumental rationality. Is then instrumental rationality, a goal-oriented 
way of acting, incompatible with KCI? And if it is not, under what circumstances 
can that be? 
  
1.2 Limitations 
 Game theory is used as a proxy for instrumental rationality and used 
throughout this analysis where several simplifying assumptions were made. 
Symmetric games, strong preferences, common knowledge, perfect information, 
consistency of preferences and so on. Naturally, the results are expected to hold 
only within this framework. The analysis focuses mainly on a special game 
theoretic setting, the Prisoner’s Dilemma, which captures the main intuition upon 
the analysis here being made. Further assumptions are made throughout the paper, 
most of them in my opinion either reasonable or not crucial for the relevant 
conclusions drawn. 
  
1.3 Structure 
 This paper is divided in seven parts. After the introduction, Part two starts 
by analyzing KCI and the basic axioms from which it is derived. The analysis 
continues with part three into introducing instrumental rationality and its 
axiomatic foundations. The fourth part begins with the motivation for the use of 
game theory as a proxy for instrumental rationality. This part is then divided in 
another four sections. The first introduces the notation and structure of the classic 
two person game, defining the concepts used through the other three parts, ending 
with the presentation of the prisoner’s dilemma and its incompatibility with KCI. 
In the second section, repeated games are introduced and compatibility between 
KCI and instrumental rationality presented as the cooperative equilibrium, ending 
with the remark that motivation is in need to consider the Pareto-efficient 
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outcome, KCI’s course of action. The third section explains KCI’s foundations 
from an evolutionary perspective, establishing the interdependency of values, 
norms and evolutionary success, addressing the problem outlined in the end of the 
second section. The fourth and last section addresses the implication of the size of 
communities into cooperation and therefore the compatibility between 
instrumental behavior and KCI. The fifth part is devoted to some concluding 
remarks. 
 
 
2. Kant’s Categorical Imperative 
 
“I am never to act otherwise than so that I could also will that my maxim 
should become universal law. Here, now, it is the simple conformity to law in 
general, without assuming any particular law applicable to certain actions, that 
serves the will as its principle, and must so serve it, if duty is not to be a vain 
delusion and a chimeric vision”  
Immanuel Kant in Serafini (1989) 
 
Kant’s Categorical Imperative can be found in the framework of Moral 
Philosophy, a branch of philosophy that, among other issues, addresses the 
question of what one should do. Kant tries to construct a standard by which all 
ordinary moral judgements should be measured, in his book “The Groundwork of 
the Metaphysics of Morals”. He then proceeds arguing that such a standard must 
be established a priori. To support such a claim, Kant argues that such a principle 
emerges from the logical relationship between concepts as duty, obligation and 
good will. He argues that “Duty is the necessity to act out of reverence for the 
law” Serafini (1989). Laws emerge, through a process of public choice, result 
from common practices, customs, social norms and so on. The concept of duty, 
even though it is absolute in its own definition, can change from community to 
community as practices, customs and social norms. Thus, laws also change. 
Obligations, in this context, are the acts one is required to carry out by moral or 
legal imperatives as in Zimmerman (1996). The concept of good will entails the 
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character of autonomous, independent goodness. The will is good by the intent, 
the motivation, regardless of its consequences. Concepts are themselves a priori 
of observations and therefore also such a standard or principle. As a result of them 
and the fact that such a principle has to be absolute in nature, it is independent of 
any a posteriori result. The principle he devises is known as Kant’s Categorical 
Imperative (KCI): one should act as one would like it to become a universal law. 
It is categorical because it applies unconditionally, without references to any end 
in particular. It is imperative simply because it is a command, a must do 
instruction. For example, suppose that one agrees with someone about a loan and 
then defaults on the payment. If when he contracted the obligation, he did not 
have the intent of keeping it, he is not fulfilling his duty, by failing to conform to 
his obligation. The maxim, ask for a “loan and then default on the payment “ 
could not be elevated to a common law once it would mean that the one who 
defaults would also be defaulted in a loan. The essence of immorality is then to 
act in such a way, that the will reveals the desire that course of action not to be 
elevated into a common law. 
 
 
3. Instrumental Rationality 
 
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that 
we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address 
ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love.”  
Adam Smith (1776) 
 
Instrumental rationality is the building block of most economic theory. It is 
the outcome of each action that commands what one should do in order to be 
rational. Rationality is seen in this context as a mean to an end: maximizing 
utility. It requires that one ranks one’s preferences consistently and that one’s 
behaviour should reflect the maximization of one’s preferences. The preferences 
should be logically consistent. The importance of logical consistency was well 
demonstrated by Bertrand Russell in one of his public lectures. He argued that 
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from a contradictory set of axioms, everything can be deduced. So, at some point, 
an individual rose from the audience and defied Russell to prove that 
from 522  , that he and the Pope were the same. Russell then argued that if 
2+2=5, that means 4=5. So, let’s subtract 2 from each side. That gives us 2=3. 
Transposing, we have 3=2. Now, let’s subtract 1 from each side. 2=1. Now, since 
the Pope and Russell are two different people, and 2=1... The Pope and Russell 
are one. This contradiction is a good example of why preferences, to be 
consistent, should follow determined rules, axioms that should be consistent in 
order to avoid such illogical results. As in Hausman (1992), the model needs the 
axiom of completeness. Given any two goods, one should be able to compare 
them in the sense that a relationship of preference can be established. One should 
be able to tell whether a is preferred to b, ba  , b is preferred to a, ab   or 
finally if the agent is indifferent between a and b, ba  . It needs the axiom of 
transitivity. Given three goods a, b and c, if a is preferred to b and b is preferred 
to c, then, a must be preferred to c. Assumes also reflexivity of preferences, a 
good is as good as itself, aa  .  
 
 
4. Theoretical Analysis 
 
The issue in this analysis is about people making decisions, deciding 
strategies. In the early days of economic theory, through the works of classics like 
Adam Smith, the greater good could be achieved through the pursuit of self-
interest. The classic reasoning assumed that markets free from intervention would 
lead to efficiency. Once the equilibrium is achieved,   no one could be better off 
without it being at somebody else’s expense. Inefficient markets were seen as a 
result of some form of market friction, protectionism, government intervention, 
asymmetric information or unenforceable property rights. What game theory later 
showed was that things may, in some circumstances, be different. This will be 
shown within the framework of the Prisoner’s Dilemma setup. Inefficient 
outcomes can arise even in such circumstances. Game theory has since then been 
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at the core of most analysis. Nowadays it is the main analytical tool towards the 
analysis of interactions between agents.  
 
4.1 The base line “one shot” prisoner’s dilemma case 
Having motivated the use of game theory as a relevant tool to analyze 
strategic interactions between agents, one should define the concepts forward 
used. These strategic interactions are commonly referred to as games in the 
literature. As in Nyberg (2003), a game  PSNG ,, is defined by },...,2,1{ nN  , 
the set of players (agents), the set of possible actions and the set of players’ 
payoffs. The set of possible actions for each player is the set iS of strategies is  
available to him. By combining all sets of strategies for all players we 
get }...{ 21 nSSSS  , the strategy space. The payoffs are the outcome of the 
game, defined for a specific player and a specific strategy profile. The payoff 
player i gets for a strategy combination s, is isP . sP is then the vector listing each 
player’s payoff for a strategy combination s. Let’s look at the case where there are 
two players }2,1{N , a strategy set for each player i with two possible strategy 
choices },{
21 iii
ssS   resulting in a strategy space 
       },;,;,;,{}{ 221221122211211121 ssssssssSSS   of four elements. The 
payoffs are therefore going to be defined on the strategy space elements: 
),(),();,(),();,(),();,(),( 2212211222112111 hgssPfessPdcssPbassP  . Let’s 
also assume that the agents want to maximize their payoffs, common knowledge, 
that they decide simultaneously what to do or that they have no information about 
the other agent’s choices and finally that they are fully informed of the structure 
of the game.  Games following these assumptions are referred too as normal form 
games. They can be more easily interpreted if put in matrix form as in Fig.1: 
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The equilibria are defined as situations where, none of the players can be 
better of by unilaterally changing their strategy. In such conditions, we refer to 
them as Nash Equilibria (NE). The outcome of the game is defined by the 
equilibria strategies and the corresponding payoffs for each player:   21 , ss and 
  21 , PP . For example,  2111 , ss  with the corresponding payoff vector sP : 
    bssPassP  2111221111 ,,,  is a NE as long as    dbea   , meaning that 
the payoff a must be preferred to payoff e for player one and that the payoff b 
must be preferred to d for player two. As referred to before, no player can gain 
from unilaterally changing their strategies. Games where the payoffs can only be 
ranked are called ordinal games. In such a case, one payoff can be said to be 
preferred to another but nothing can be said about the strength of the preference. 
In the example above one can hypothesize that for player one, the payoff a is 
preferred to payoff c but nothing can be said about how many c’s player one 
would have to be provided with to compensate the loss of a (marginal rate of 
substitution). In ranking their preferences, each of the two players, assuming 
strong preferences only (ruling out the case where one payoff can  be equal or 
better preferred than the other, often referred as being weakly preferred), can do it 
in 241234!4  ways, all the possible combinations of a chain of hierarchy 
between preferences. With two players and two possible strategies for each, one 
would have 5762424!4!4   different games. It is important then to narrow 
the scope of analysis. The games that will be under analysis are symmetric, in 
strategies and in payoffs. The motivation for this comes from the very definition 
of KCI.  
As seen before KCI implies the universality of strategies, in the sense that 
irrespectively of the payoff, individuals facing the same dilemma should act in the 
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same way. In the jargon defined above means that players with the same strategy 
set available to them should make the same strategy choices. For that case, one 
should then consider the games where the set of available strategies iS to each 
player are the same, or formally, that }2,1{},,{ 21  NissSi . Another 
simplification made is that when taking the same strategy choice (in the simpler 
case with only two strategies) }{ iss  , the payoffs are the same i.e.: 
   ii sPsP 21   for both players. Let’s take a look at the payoff matrix that results 
from the assumptions made: 
 
This kind of games is said to be symmetric due to the nature of the 
payoffs’ distribution. Under the assumptions above, the number of possible games 
drastically reduces. Now, as one player ranking the preferences automatically 
ranks them to the other player, one has only 241234!4  different games. 
One type of game will be closely analyzed, the Prisoner’s Dilemma. The 
example is given by two thieves that are caught by the police and are kept in 
separate rooms. The detectives don’t have that many pieces of evidence on them 
so if none of them confesses, they both get convicted for a minor crime. If they 
both confess they both get convicted with a reduced sentence (still longer than the 
one for the minor crime) for having confessed. If one of them confesses and the 
other does not, the one that confessed walks free and the one that did not confess 
goes to jail with the longest sentence. We assume that both players want to avoid 
jail as much as possible (for preference ordering) and that their actions reflect that 
(agents are rational). They can’t communicate and therefore have no information 
of what the other thieve decided in the meanwhile (what is equivalent to 
simultaneous decisions) or form binding agreements, and they both are perfectly 
informed of the structure of the game (common knowledge). In this class of 
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games, the payoffs’ distribution (continuing with the symmetric case) must 
respect the following chain of preferences: cbad  . The outcome 
    },;,{ 212211 dssPcssP  is not stable in the sense that player one would 
increase his payoff by unilaterally changing his strategy from 1s to 2s once, by 
definition of the ranking of preferences,     cssPbssP  211221 ,,  . By 
symmetry the same applies to the outcome     },;,{ 122121 cssPdssP   and in 
this case it is player two who could improve its payoff by unilaterally changing 
his strategy. Finally, the outcome     },;,{ 112111 assPassP  is not stable either, 
once both players would gain from changing their strategies. The NE is given by 
    },;,{ 222221 bssPbssP  , once there is no way of increasing the payoff by 
any unilateral change of strategy of any of the two players. The special interest of 
this game is that if they could form a binding agreement, if they could impose a 
universal law for them to follow (and if it is universal it is by definition the same 
for everyone facing the same dilemma as it is the case), if they would cooperate, 
they would promptly agree that their strategy choices would be 1s , once the payoff 
both would get, a, is preferred to the payoff they both get in equilibria b. This is a 
clear case that shows that a NE needs not to be Pareto efficient. At least one 
person could be made better off without making anyone worse off. In this case, 
even both would be better off. The desired universal law, in which both players 
would choose 1s , is not observed and, in this example, KCI and instrumental 
rationality yield different courses of action, i.e. strategy choices. This particular 
game is also interesting because the distribution of payoffs reflect much of what 
takes place in reality. First there are increasing returns to scale in the sense that 
two players cooperating (choosing the Pareto-efficient outcome) are better off 
than not cooperating. Then, there is a reward to unilateral defection, what can be 
seen as some sort of advantage gained or appropriation of part of the other 
player’s investment in the not observed cooperative result. This result, that two 
individuals following rational courses of action end being worst off is the 
foundation of the impact game theory had in the dominium of the social sciences, 
as opposed to the classic invisible hand mechanisms that would conduce markets 
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to efficiency by themselves.  But this analysis only takes into account that players 
interact once. If time comes into play, the analysis will be different.  
 
4.2 Repeated Interaction 
A common approach is that extending the analysis for repeated games, the 
scope for cooperation, in the sense of following the desired universal law, 
emerges naturally, purely from instrumental reason without the need of any sort of 
explicit binding agreement. The problem is that if the preferences are only ordinal, 
there is no way of taking into account the total utility agents get from repeating a 
game. This way, the analysis is extended in the sense that the preferences are to be 
defined cardinally. Now, values (utility measures) are assigned to payoffs. One is 
not only able to rank the preferences but also to say how much the agent is willing 
to give up from the outcome of playing strategy 1 for the outcome of strategy 2. 
Assuming the same game structure as before, a strategy for the repeated game has 
to be defined. Several could be chosen: one could choose to defect in every period 
of the game, or cooperate in the first period and then defect in the following 
periods. A particular strategy, “Tit for Tat” has shown to be particular robust, 
empirically and theoretically, as in Axelrod and Hamilton (1981). In this strategy, 
agents cooperate on the first round and then simply repeat the other agent’s play 
on the previous interaction. If the game is repeated indefinitely, or has an 
uncertain end (otherwise, as shown by backward induction, the results won’t 
differ from the one-period game), players will have to sum up the payoffs from 
period after period. Naturally, future payoffs are expected, for the same amount of 
utility given in their period, to be less valuable, and that factor should be taken 
into account when calculating the present value of each of the alternative 
strategies. From now on, let’s call strategy 1 cooperate and strategy 2 defect. 
Assuming a discount rate of per period, a payoff from the thn game will be worth 
1n  times less than the first. From the assumption that future payoffs are less 
valuable, ceteris paribus, it is implied that the value for  must rely between zero 
(below zero discount rates would have no economic sense) and one: 
 1,0:   . 
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When  is zero, it means that the individuals do not assign any utility to 
future payoffs and the game can be reduced to the one interaction case. When  is 
one, agents take future payoffs as much into account as current payoffs. As agents 
are not sure when the game will end, the payoffs are calculated as if the game 
would be repeated infinitely. Given the assumptions below, player’s }2,1{i  
strategy at interaction (time) t is then: 




 
otherwiseDefects
CooperatesifCooperates
t
tt
,1
1,2,1
 
Given this, one can construct the expressions representing the payoff for 
cooperating in the first round, or defecting from the start, given that the other 
player starts by cooperating and following the same strategy (“Tit for Tat”). As n 
is assumed to be infinite, the result is a geometric progression, converging to the 
values represented by the expressions below: 
bdbbbdV
aaaaaaV
nD
i
nC
i










1
...
1
...
2
2
 
The first equation gives the value of cooperating, given that the other 
player cooperates (the trigger strategy). The second equation yields the value of 
defecting. As the trigger strategy was to start cooperating, player i gets a reward 
for cheating in the first period but, as seen before, this situation is not stable, once 
in the next period, the other player will also change its strategy  and the payoff 
will be of c for each period (the original static NE), a result of both players 
defecting from the initial strategy of cooperating. Cooperation is rational as long 
as the value of cooperating is bigger than the value of defecting: 
bd
ad
bdaa






 




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This last expression
bd
ad


 is the threshold value for the discount rate 
above which cooperating is more rewarding than defecting. The higher the returns 
to cooperation  ba  , the lower the threshold value for the discount rate has to be 
in order for cooperation to be achieved, for a given reward d for unilateral 
defection. These kinds of results are commonly known in the literature as Folk 
12 
theorems. They show that when time comes into play, at the threat of retaliation, 
the scope for cooperation increases. In the cases where the agents’ subjective 
discount factor is sufficiently big, KCI and instrumental rationality yield the 
same choice of strategies, therefore being compatible in that sense. An example of 
increasing scope for cooperation when time comes into play can be devised. 
Nevertheless, there is literature concerning the fact that under certain assumptions, 
the scope for cooperation can actually decrease as a function of higher discount 
rates i.e. if the agents value more future payoffs. Following Skaperdas & 
Syropoulos (1996) and Skaperdas & Garfinkel (2000), if defecting in the present 
will lead to an increase in payoffs tomorrow, the more one values these future 
payoffs, the more prone one will be in considering the benefits of defecting. As 
the authors point out, a King deciding whether to engage into war or not, has to 
take into account the strategic implications a loss in the first interaction would 
imply in the payoffs for the available strategies in the second period and so on. If 
facing a prisoner’s dilemma situation, the King gets cheated by his counterpart 
and sees the opponent appropriating part of his territory, the payoffs for the same 
strategies would diminish in the second period, once the resources generated by 
the appropriated factors are no longer available. Also, the King’s strategic 
strength would diminish in the forthcoming period once it has less resources and 
the higher the value put upon future payoffs, i.e. the higher the discount rate is, 
the more scope for conflict. On the other hand, by symmetry, the opponents’ 
decision to cheat in the first period is rewarded with the strengthening of his 
strategic position on the second period, once, as before, doing better in the first 
period will make the defecting King to do better in the second period. The rational 
choice of strategies for both parties will then be to defect right from the first 
period. Given this game structure (increased payoffs in future games as function 
of current defection), the time-extended approach will increase the scope for 
defection. 
Back to the traditional folk theorem, once adjusted for a proper discount 
rate, KCI and instrumental rationality yield the same course of action, suggesting 
that they are in fact compatible given that the agents value future payoffs above a 
certain threshold. However, there is a problem with this way of reasoning. Acting 
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according to KCI also requires that one’s choices of acting have a merit of their 
own. They should not be judged having as reference the utility they would yield. 
In other words, one’s conduct should not be dependent on the outcome. The 
strategy choice of cooperating satisfies KCI’s condition of universality but relies 
upon the weighting of the payoffs of the possible outcomes. One needs to have a 
good reason to believe why a Pareto efficient equilibria should be the individual’s 
choice resulting from the desired universal law, other than higher payoffs. A law 
or norm that, as defined above, would emerge from the axiomatic reasoning of the 
base concepts of good will, duty and obligation that are in the origin of KCI.  
These concepts themselves emerge from common practices, customs, social 
norms and so on, instead of coming directly from weighting utilities and choosing 
strategies accordingly. If such reason exists, KCI and instrumental rationality can 
coexist, yielding the same course of action, under the circumstances illustrated 
above, and show that cooperation may not only be the result of instrumental 
behavior. 
 
4.3 Social Norms as Selective Advantages 
I expect that I have shown how KCI behaviour can, in some circumstances 
be explained, on what the outcome of the strategies is concerned, as a form of 
time-extended instrumental rationality. There is room though to clarify why the 
individuals would, independently from the outcomes, elect a course of action that 
would increase efficiency (to act in such a way that the equilibrium will be the 
Pareto-efficient one instead the “prisoner’s dilemma trap”). It has been argued, as 
in Ullmann-Margalit (1977), that the function of moral norms is precisely to 
enable agents to coordinate and cooperate to achieve the Pareto-efficient results in 
situations where the pure pursuit of self-interest, in the classic sense, prevents the 
agents from achieving such an objective. In fact, the importance of attaining 
efficient results can be seen on how societies have evolved through time. If we 
look back to the dawn of mankind, it’s not hard to realize how cooperation has its 
merits. Synergy effects (or more technically, increasing returns to scale) made 
men cooperate in hunting and fighting. A tribe with greater cohesion, greater 
propensity to cooperation between its members would be a tribe that would have, 
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ceteris paribus, a greater probability of winning a war. Consequently, any factor 
that would enforce cohesion, cooperation, would be a selective advantage.  
Social norms play an extremely important role in this mechanism. 
Religion, laws, education and so on, are all mechanisms that enforce cohesion 
between the members of a society. Even Adam Smith, defending “invisible hand” 
processes, decentralized equilibria achieved by the pure pursuit of self-interest of 
individuals, safeguarded that some structures need to be present in society for 
efficiency to be achieved in such a way. He stressed the importance of property 
rights and general observance of social norms such as the interdiction of stealing 
or misrepresentation. The Ten Commandments are a good example of a code of 
conduct that obeys to KCI reasoning.  
Agents in the prisoner’s dilemma case would even be willing to give some 
of their Pareto-efficient payoffs in order to ensure a better outcome. In the picture 
below, the grey area represents all the possible payoffs where any of the agents 
would be better off at no expense to the other player.  
 
In this example, it is considered that the payoffs are infinitely divisible, a 
simplification that is necessary for the picture above to be consistent. Keeping 
symmetry of payoffs for simplification purposes, any combination of payoffs 
belonging to the segment   aabb ,,  would be preferred to the outcome  bb, . For 
example, both agents would be willing to give up ta  of their individual Pareto-
efficient payoff in order to pay for some kind of mechanism that would enforce 
cooperation. The area  2tak  represents then the demand for enforceable, 
credible, binding regulations (in the form of institutions, norms, social pressure) 
for a given alternate possible payoff of t for both players. Not only are these 
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factors selective advantages, but also a rational inherent desire from the agents. As 
in Thoreau (1849), “Let every man make known what kind of government would 
command his respect, and that will be one step toward obtaining it.” It’s only 
natural that throughout the ages they are so thoroughly institutionalized. As they 
are internalized into their personal beliefs, generation after generation, it is more 
likely that the agents’ values and concepts as the ones defined above (good will, 
duty and obligation) will reflect cooperative behaviour. Even though the channels 
of intergenerational transmission of values and norms may be innumerable, it is 
reasonable to assume that many are acquired by observation, by reverence 
towards references’ (family, teachers, preachers and sport stars or rock singers 
and so on..) behavior, by what is part of the status quo. At this point, values and 
norms will shape agents’ wills in the Kantian sense, and will therefore elect 
courses of action, strategies that are trendily efficient. Institutions are designed to 
ensure the stability of such state of things. Today virtually any society has courts, 
police, schools, churches, all of which perfect examples of mechanisms that are 
designed to ensure that, in a compelling way, individuals are integrated socially, 
that they behave in a KCI perspective.  
The fact that given strategies guided by instrumentally driven factors 
(inherent instrumental rationality or evolutionarily selected efficiency enhancing 
values and norms), are selective advantages is a common approach in 
evolutionary game theory. In particular, certain strategies may reveal themselves 
to be more successful than others. In the late 1970’s, Robert Axelrod held a 
tournament where intellectuals from a wide range of fields participated in 
repeated prisoner’s dilemma games of approximately 200 rounds. Each contestant 
had its proposed strategy played against the other proposed strategies in five 
period games. The strategy that had the highest score was submitted by Anatol 
Rapoport and it was precisely the “Tit for Tat” strategy. A good way to 
understand how this is meaningful in the evolutionary systems context is to 
observe the Spatialized Prisoner’s Dilemma, as in Grimm (1997). In this case, the 
space is represented by a surface of contingent squares. To each square is 
randomly assigned one of eight different types of players. Each player type has a 
distinctive strategy profile. Games with the structure mentioned above (repeated 
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games with uncertain ends and prisoner’s dilemma structure of preferences) are 
played between each player and all his neighbours (players in contingent squares). 
In the end, scores are tallied and if a player gets a score that is lower than any of 
the contingent players, it replicates the strategy of the highest scoring player in the 
next round. If no contingent player had higher scores in that interaction, the 
strategy profile is kept and applied again in the next interaction. In the following 
example eight types of agents, each one with its own different strategy, 
represented by eight different colours compete for the dominance of the squares. 
Screenshots of the playing surface from Grimm (1997) show that in an early stage 
of the competition,  strategies that privilege defection, (shown in white and light 
grey), tend to do better in the first rounds, meaning that there are more agents 
playing those strategies, as it can be seen in the first two screenshots: 
 
 However, after some rounds, “Tit for Tat” (dark grey) starts to prevail as it 
shows in the 3rd and 4th screenshot, and after twenty six interactions, all the plane 
has been “conquered” by the agent playing “Tit for Tat”. This result is however, 
sensible to the initial conditions. Given the structure of this “experiment”, it 
cannot be proven that “Tit for Tat” will always be the dominant outcome. In fact 
other strategies can proliferate and dominate the plane. But “Tit for Tat”” has 
proven to be particularly robust. By the same way, some values, rules of conduct 
can lead to reproductive success among the populations that share them or to 
oblivion. Populations with values that defend private property and 
entrepreneurship may lead to capital accumulation and development of knowledge 
and consequently to technological superiority against populations that loath those 
same concepts. What the Spatialized Prisoner’s Dilemma example suggests is that 
cooperation is in fact superior in the long run. But “Tit-for-Tat” is not a naïve 
form of cooperation. It starts by cooperating but retaliates (by defecting, 
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something that lowers the opponent’s payoff) if the agents with whom it interacts 
defect. An analogy can be made with everyday life. In reality, people tend to 
follow the norm, at the threat of retaliation from society if going against the norm, 
through the same norms and institutions (referred above) , that as seen before are 
not only selective advantages but are also instrumentally rational desires from the 
agents. In this framework, KCI and instrumental rationality are compatible, as 
long as agents value future payoffs at an equal or greater rate than  . But can 
anything be said about the actual value of  ? If agents are in general overly 
impatient, in the sense that their subjective discount factor is below the modelled 
threshold, cooperation will never be observed even in repeated games and there is 
no scope for compatibility between KCI and instrumental rationality. Let’s 
assume then that the utility each strategy choice yields can be affected by these 
norms and institutions without altering the structure of the game i.e. the ranking of 
preferences. Remember that a prisoner’s dilemma problem requires only that 
preferences are ranked in an ordinal way. If the norms and institutions devised 
impute penalties on cheating, the value of defecting will be lower, and therefore 
lower will be the real . Overall efficiency would be easier achieved and again, 
natural selection would ensure them to last. If institutions and norms would not 
reflect such an effect they would be pointless, in this framework. Their existence 
in all societies is the best proof of their importance. 
There is an alternative way through which the above mentioned factors 
affect the outcome of agents’ interactions. One can assume they alter the structure 
of preferences and therefore alter the structure of the game. Let’s try to picture the 
following example: Pedro has bread at his place and Adam has water. They have 
the option of either trade  T  some bread for some water and they both get a 
portion of both resources,  bwbw, , or steal  S the other one’s resource. If Pedro 
intends to trade and gets robbed, he will have the worst outcome possible, being 
thirsty and hungry and Adam will have the best outcome, having all bread and 
water to himself,  BW,0 . The symmetric result occurs if Pedro is the thief and 
Adam the one that decided to trade  0,BW .If they both rob each other, they will 
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have each other’s resource, either being hungry or thirsty,  wb, . The preferences’ 
ranking is the same for both: 
NoneWaterorbreadOnlyBreadSomeWaterSomeWaterAllBreadAll  &&  
 This is a classic Prisoner’s dilemma. As before, one can devise a payoff 
matrix to better illustrate which will be the equilibria: 
 
By instrumental rationality, both individuals will try to rob each other and 
fall into the Prisoner’s Dilemma trap, ending both with each other’s resource. If 
they would cooperate with each other, by trading, they both would be better off. 
Now, suppose they both go to church on Sunday, and the word spreads around. 
Stealing is seen as a sin. The moral values of their community, which condemn 
stealing, will make stealing to be less rewarding, because Pedro and/or Adam will 
suffer from social discrimination, guilt complex or even jail possibility. That 
disutility can be reflected in the payoffs distribution. Now, the action of stealing 
will result in a specific decrease of utility to the outcome from that strategy. If the 
penalty is sufficiently high to alter the structure of preferences, a new game will 
arise. If it were not sufficient to alter the structure of preferences over a large 
enough number of people, and assuming that social norms also come from 
tradition and customs, the norm would become so widely violated that would, 
ceteris paribus, fade away. Suppose that the loss in utility implied in stealing 
(affects all payoffs resulting from the use of that strategy), makes the result from 
having some water and some bread (that can only result from trade) preferable to 
having all the water and bread (that can only be achieved by unilateral theft). The 
preferences will now become: 
NoneWaterorbreadOnlyWaterAllBreadAllBreadSomeWaterSome  &&  
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Now there are two NE, where they both trade and where they both steal. 
Consequently, the penalty imposed is not enough to enforce cooperation even 
though it changed the structure of preferences. Which equilibria will then prevail? 
Through a static approach and pure strategies, nothing can be said. But repeated 
games applied to this case, quantifying utilities (cardinal games) and again from 
the assumption they both play a trigger strategy where they are expected to trade 
in the first game and then do whatever the other one did in the previous game 
(“Tit for Tat”), will unambiguously result in cooperation once that for any value 
of the payoffs, as long as trade is marginally preferable to the unilateral defection 
reward, cooperation is always preferable to defection. Through this reasoning, and 
admitting repeated games are more plausible to observe in reality rather than static 
games, instrumental rationality and KCI behaviour would induce the same choice 
of strategies, regardless of how agents subjectively value future payoffs. Again, 
social norms, values and institutions are presented as selective advantages 
increasing efficiency. Even though they imply only loss of utility in the outcomes, 
the change in the strategic context makes the overall result more efficient. With 
greater resources available to them, groups would be more successful in terms of 
natural selection and transmit those cultural factors to the forthcoming 
generations. Even though that seems to be the general case, exceptions can be 
thought of. There may still be values and norms that in some situations may 
apparently induce inefficient outcomes. In the following example,  a patient with 
severe brain damage and in a permanent coma, left expressed in her will that if 
found in such conditions, would like to have shut down any artificial mean of life 
support. The patient revealed her preference and society would save resources if 
the life support mechanisms would be shut down. Nonetheless, life support could 
be maintained for a long period, due to values as the inviolability of human life, 
and the obligation to fulfil the duty of assistance.  
 
4.4 The importance of the size of communities 
From the reasoning above one would be eager to assume that the natural 
outcome for this entire story would be to have one homogenised society, with one 
set of norms or values, reasoning in the same way. As in Alesina & Spolaore 
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(1997) there are several benefits of larger societies or countries. As population 
size increases, per-capita cost of public goods decreases and there are increases in 
productivity from benefiting from larger markets. The increasing returns to scale 
assumption made above also helps.  If we look to the prisoner’s dilemma case, 
and instead of assuming two players interacting, we assume two group leaders, 
deciding on whether to cooperate or not in commerce for example, the same 
reasoning above can be applied to defend that groups will cooperate. By 
cooperating, they tend to build common laws, practises, customs and institutions. 
Most theories in the framework of international economics, stress the overall 
gains from cooperation (trade) between economic blocks, and again, institutions 
were created and policies implemented to walk in such direction. Historically, this 
increasing homogeneity cannot be denied. The increasing network of commercial 
and cultural relationships between all countries can rely also in the progressive 
strengthening of international law. Organizations like the United Nations and the 
World Trade Organization might seem powerless in same cases in the present day, 
but from a historical perspective their influence is not comparable with anything 
seen before in terms of enforcing international common rules upon the world, 
either on the credibility of the threat of enforcement and the extent they can reach.  
Even though it seems to trend in this way, there are factors that may slow 
down the process or even halt it. Alesina and Spolaore (1997) argue that the 
greater the number of members of a population, the harder it is to be 
homogeneous. Even considering that there are increasing returns to cooperation, 
there will be a number of individuals within a population from which they will 
have to occupy a so vast area (using a particular notion of distance to be better 
explained below), that interaction between all individuals will become more 
difficult and heterogeneity will grow. As Aristotle once said, “experience has 
shown that it is difficult, if not impossible, for a populous state to be run by good 
laws” Saunders and Sinclair (1981). Heterogeneity, or diversity of preferences, 
can lead to serious economic and political setbacks. Easterly and Levine (1997) 
show how ethnic diversity interferes with good governance. To better illustrate the 
impact that the size of a community can have in cooperation, let’s refer to the 
repeated game example given above. As it was demonstrated, the scope for 
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cooperation increases with the time-extended approach. But the model is limited 
in the sense that players are expected to play the game ad eternum which is not 
very reasonable, or that they are uncertain about when the game ends. As nothing 
is said about the effect of the number of individuals in a group upon the 
probability of the interactions being more frequent, the model is extended to 
incorporate such an effect. Now, future payoffs are discounted not only by the 
subjective discount rate (how agents “value” time) but also by the probability 
agents assign for them to interact more than once. Again, symmetry is assumed 
upon those expectations, implied by the common knowledge assumption. Let’s 
assume that there is a probability p that the game will end at the second 
interaction. This can be interpreted like the probability of meeting two times with 
player two and repeat the interaction. For the payoff of the first interaction, p is 
one, once the player is actually facing the interaction. Then, the probability of the 
agents interacting is increasingly smaller, in the sense that it is more probable that 
the agents interact twice than three times and so on. For simplification purposes it 
is assumed that the probability value assigned for each period decreases in the 
same functional form of the discount rate, once it respects the condition of 
monotonicity. 
Now, the expected values for cooperation and defection are: 
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The threshold value for the discount rate, which promotes cooperation, is 
then given by: 
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As by definition of probability,  1,0p  even though in this case, one has 
to exclude the possibility of p being zero for the expression to be meaningful and 
of one, else wise one would be back in the traditional folk theorem case. When p 
is zero, it means that we are back at the initial static game, once that the 
probability of interacting more than one time is zero. For any other value of p, the 
denominator is smaller and therefore, the value for the discount rate increases. 
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Agents have to give higher value to the future in order to cooperate. In other 
words cooperation is harder. But, an increase in the discount rate cannot offset a 
decrease in the probability of the agents meeting again ad eternum. If
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the discount rate would have to rise up to 1
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 , meaning that 
future payoffs would have to be as much valuable as current payoffs, which does 
not make sense. If the probability is even lower, future payoffs would have to be 
more highly regarded than current payoffs. It is only reasonable to assume that 
below the threshold value for p, cooperation is no longer viable, no matter how 
highly agents value their future payoffs. 
Thus, to make the connection between the probability of the interaction 
and N, the number of people inside a certain group, the probability is now going 
to be a decreasing function of the number of individuals that constitute the 
reference group:   2,
1
 N
N
Np , meaning that the higher the number of agents 
within a group, the lesser the probability the same two agents will meet again. 
As before the value for each strategy is given by: 
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Cooperation is viable when: 
bd
ad
N
bd
N
ad
b
N
Nda
N
Na










)(
11
1
1
1
1
1





 
For a unit increase in population  1N , the threshold value 
for increases by 
bd
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

, and following the same reasoning as before, enforcing 
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cooperation becomes harder and harder as the population grows. Cooperation is 
no longer feasible once the population number is equal or greater than
ad
bd


, the 
value for N above which the discount rate becomes greater than 1. This result 
suggests that cooperation in a random interaction is more probable in smaller 
communities (smaller N) than in big communities (larger N) for a given discount 
rate, what seems in-line with reality. This approach presents a fixed population 
threshold for a given value of the discount rate, above which no cooperation 
would be observed. However, the critical value for the discount rate as a function 
of the size of population depends on the returns to cooperation,  ba   given that 
the returns to unilateral defection remain unchanged. As these increase, the 
threshold value for the discount rate
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, below which no cooperation is 
viable, decreases. If the condition for cooperation (agents valuation of future 
payoffs equal or greater than ) was satisfied before, the size of the community N 
can increase, at least until 
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 equals the previous threshold discount rate 
 without jeopardizing cooperation. For example, with the Industrial Revolution, 
productivity increased a great deal. It seems reasonable to assume, that the returns 
to cooperative behaviour increased also with such productivity increases, what 
would then lead to the sustainability of greater populations.  
An alternative way of allowing technological progress to have an impact in 
the sustainability of cooperation in the model is to assume that the probability of a 
repeated interaction p is not only a function of the population size but also of 
technology progress,  ANp , . Assuming that the size of the population affects 
negatively the probability of repeated interaction, 0


N
p
and that the 
technological progress affects it positively, 0


A
p
 the sustained population size 
for a given discount rate depends on the relative effects of these variables. This 
approach has the merit of not relying in specific functional forms, maintaining the 
same reasoning. Nevertheless, in both cases, the case for compatibility with KCI 
decreases with the introduction of probabilities. Furthermore, it is reasonable to 
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admit that the increasing returns to cooperation cannot hold ad infinitum. There 
are significant agency costs, and it is only natural to expect that, after a certain 
point, the returns to cooperation might be, at least in part, offset by those. All this 
suggests that there is a limit, also dependent on technological factors, beyond 
which no cooperation would be expected. This comes from the smaller probability 
of repeated interaction in greater communities. With less repeated interaction and 
cooperation, diversity is likely to grow once, as said before, it is isolation that 
creates diversity. The motivation for the probability of interaction being positively 
related to technology progress comes from the relation between distance and 
isolation. Distance in this context, means how far a representative individual’s 
actions can reach during his lifetime. According to this concept, the revolution on 
transportation and communication made distances shorter and dramatically 
minimized the effect of this variable during the last 500 years. If we go back 
20000 years ago, the cavemen or nomads could only spread their influence by the 
distance they could cover on foot. In one day, he could at maximum cover say 
50km. 1500 years ago, men horseback riding, could cover 300km in one day. 
After the industrial revolution and the railroad, 15000km could be daily achieved. 
Today, in one day, one can go around the world. This largely diminishes the effect 
of distance upon isolation and therefore the “creation” of diversity. The 
assumption that technological progress affects positively the probability of 
interaction as has a positive effect in cooperation holds as long as it is assumed 
that it affects agents in the same way, i.e. that symmetry is reasonably kept. A 
technological breakthrough exclusive only to one agent or one community may 
alter the strategic characteristics of the interactions and thus have the opposite 
effect, making defection more attractive. The threat of retaliation that is at the 
base of the evolutionary success of cooperation may become obsolete due to an 
unbalance in the strategic strength between the communities. Vikings used the 
long boat to reach farther lands and pillage other populations. But they did so, 
precisely because of the asymmetry of technological development on what the 
knowledge of the sea and crafts were concerned. The threat of retaliation was kept 
to a minimum because the pillaged populations had few if any possibility at all of 
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chasing the Vikings. In this strategic context, with no serious threat of retaliation 
at sight, technological progress might have precisely the opposite effect.  
Technology improves the ability to spread influence in another important 
way: information technology. As writing was invented, knowledge could pass not 
only between individuals but also from generation to generation in a more 
accurate and consistent way. Nonetheless, it was only with the printing press that 
a true revolution came in the massification of coherent information. In the dusk of 
the XIX century, as the first radio signals were transmitted, information started to 
travel at the speed of light. The 30’s brought us television and advertising. The 
80’s the internet. Today, in this global village, South Koreans eat at McDonald’s 
and South Africans read The Economist. Again, it is isolation that creates 
diversity.  Finally assuming that populations with different social norms tend to be 
less interdependent and that may even fight for dominance of their values, again 
the size of communities has a central role. In the beginning, greater cohesion will 
make a population more successful towards others. This will increase the number 
of individuals that constitutes it, either by reproductive success, either by 
assimilating other populations into theirs. However, as the society grows and 
becomes stronger, it occupies a larger area (using the distance notion referred 
above) and diminishes the probability of repeated interaction between the same 
agents. This heterogeneity can be the source of much political unrest as agency 
costs get higher and control more difficult. This reasoning raises the idea that 
countries are more heterogeneous outside (when compared to other countries) 
than they are inside (when analyzed from its own regions perspective), on what 
geography and social norms is concerned what is obviously in line with reality. 
Social norms that embrace values promoting efficiency and the selective 
advantage that they bring upon greater cohesion, make at least to some degree, 
KCI’s behaviour to predominate, precisely because the concepts that are on its 
origin, are a result of instrumentally driven mechanisms. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
The aim of this paper is to assess the scope for compatibility between KCI 
and instrumental rationality. They are opposite in nature. KCI conduct relies on 
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the merit of the action disregarding whatever utility that particular course of 
action might give. Reason and autonomy lead the individual to achieve moral 
righteousness. On the other hand, in instrumental rationality, people’s behavior is 
supposed to reflect the act of maximizing the utility the taking of those actions 
yields. Reason exists in this framework as an instrument to achieve utility. From 
this perspective, there is little room for compatibility between these two concepts. 
People tend to be instrumental in nature and rule their everyday lives by choosing 
outcomes taking into account the utility they yield. Nevertheless, moral also plays 
a part in people’s decisions. People share values and their preferences are 
influenced by them. Norms and institutions are supposed to be the materialization 
of those same values. Once established a link between the Kantian merit of an 
action and the payoffs such actions yield, the possibility of compatibility arises. 
The basic axioms where KCI is derived from are a function of people’s customs, 
traditions and so on. These customs and traditions are presented as determinant in 
the evolutionary success of a population. Their existence implies the 
establishment of links of cooperation between people. Some values can be 
“better”, in evolutionary terms, than others. Where some values and norms can 
lead to reproductive success of populations, others can lead to oblivion. The 
Spatialized Prisoner’s dilemma is a good illustration of such mechanisms. Once 
established that the long run evolutionary success of a population is affected by 
such values and norms, it is only natural to expect individuals to reflect more 
efficient forms of behaviour. The link between values and norms and efficiency 
conducive behavior is the key to assure that KCI and instrumental rationality can 
be compared in the first place. One of the interesting features of the classic 
Prisoner’s Dilemma is that, following the reasoning above, KCI and instrumental 
rationality invite to different courses of action. They are clearly incompatible, but 
when time comes into to play, cooperation becomes more likely and the scope for 
compatibility increases. The introduction of the population size dependent 
probabilities in the repeated game analysis increases the realism of the model and 
shows that the probability of cooperative behavior in a random interaction is 
higher in a small size community than in a bigger one, something that seems in-
line with reality. 
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